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When reasoning counterfactually, we think of alternative possibilities to what we know to 
be true about the world by imagining what would have happened had a situation been different. 
Research has yielded mixed findings and substantial debate over when this ability develops, how 
it is best conceptualized, and what functions it serves. In this article, we propose a framework of 
counterfactual reasoning in development. We argue that counterfactual reasoning is best 
understood by looking both at the representations of reality children manipulate counterfactually, 
and the cognitive processes that make up and contribute to counterfactual reasoning. In so doing, 
we highlight the fact that many of the component skills are present in early childhood. This 
framework yields testable predictions about children’s counterfactual reasoning across a range of 
situations. We also discuss recent work that examines the contribution of counterfactual 
reasoning to learning in childhood.   
 
  
Much of our time is spent thinking about what we know to be untrue. We often generate 
counterfactual thoughts especially when faced with unexpected or negative events, imagining 
what could have been done differently to undo the negative outcome (e.g., If I hadn’t left food in 
my office, there wouldn’t be mice living here now.). Counterfactuals are not only generated when 
thinking about personal events, but are also involved in scientific, legal, and historical reasoning. 
For instance, generating counterfactual alternatives to historical events (e.g., What if Napoleon 
had won the Battle of Waterloo?) can help explain causal forces in both the past and the present. 
Considering counterfactual possibilities (e.g., What would the world be like with no bees?) can 
stimulate scientific hypotheses, inspire documentaries, and drive policy. 
The boundary conditions for counterfactual thinking and the extent to which it relies on 
the same underlying cognitive mechanisms as related abilities, such as future thinking and 
pretend play, are the subjects of substantial debate (e.g., Beck, 2016; Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013). 
Many researchers construe counterfactual reasoning broadly as the ability to generate alternative 
representations to reality. On this broad interpretation, counterfactuals may take the form of 
imagined alternatives to past events, future hypotheticals, pretend play, and even fiction (e.g., 
Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013; Woodward, 2011). Other researchers argue that counterfactual 
reasoning is a specific ability to reason about alternatives to past events (e.g., Beck, 2016; 
Epstude & Roese, 2008). In large part, this is likely due to the fact that thinking counterfactually 
about the past serves unique social and psychological functions (e.g., attributing causation and 
blame, adapting one’s behavior; Epstude & Roese, 2008). Given this debate, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that conclusions about when children begin to reason counterfactually are mixed. 
Indeed, for nearly every finding showing that children of a certain age can think 
counterfactually, there is another finding that, given a slightly different set of criteria, children 
 
  
fail to do so. Evidence suggests that the earliest children can reason counterfactually is at around 
age 4 (e.g., Guarjardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Harris, German, & Mills, 1996; Nyhout & Ganea, 
2019a), but studies show that children do not do so until middle to late childhood (e.g., Beck, 
Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013). 
Apart from a lack of consensus on what researchers mean when they use the word 
counterfactual, we need a unified theoretical framework that specifies the processes involved in 
generating counterfactuals so we can draw specific and testable predictions. By characterizing 
the cognitive processes involved in counterfactual reasoning, we can understand more deeply 
what this type of reasoning shares with other abilities and how it is distinct. In this article, we 
present a process view of counterfactual reasoning, which explains discrepant findings and leads 
to new predictions. We conceptualize counterfactual reasoning as a form of reasoning in which 
one contemplates a change to a mental representation and reasons about the causal implications 
of this change. Therefore, we take a narrower view than those who suggest that counterfactuals 
are any form of alternative to reality, but a broader view than those who confine counterfactuals 
to past events. The process of contemplating a change to a representation could be enacted either 
on a past event from episodic memory or a causal system (e.g., an ecosystem) from semantic 
memory. Given that most research with children has focused on past event counterfactuals, most 
of our discussion is in this context. Limited work has focused on children’s counterfactual 
reasoning about causal systems from semantic memory, but we expect a similar developmental 
timeline and developmental and situational constraints to affect this ability.  
First, we outline the core cognitive processes underlying counterfactual reasoning, 
highlighting that many of them are present as developmental precursors in toddlerhood, and 
relate them to other abilities to imagine alternatives. Then, we outline constraints on children’s 
 
  
ability to think counterfactually. These include the model of reality that children represent, 
domain-specific causal knowledge, and domain-general cognitive abilities. This framework 
integrates aspects of previous accounts highlighting the role of domain-specific (Sobel, 2011) 
and domain-general abilities (Beck & Riggs, 2014) in counterfactual reasoning. We interpret the 
findings through the lens of this framework, and conclude by highlighting emerging areas of 
research on the utility of counterfactual reasoning in learning. 
 
A Framework for the Development of Counterfactual Reasoning 
Core Processes 
When thinking counterfactually, one represents a change to reality and the causal 
implications of this change. We argue that these can be divided into three core processes. In 
describing these processes, we refer to a common task in studies of the development of 
counterfactual reasoning. In Harris and colleagues’ (1996) seminal study, children hear about a 
girl, Carol, who enters her kitchen wearing muddy boots and makes the floor dirty. They are then 
asked what the state of the floor would have been had she removed her shoes. 
First, the child must retrieve from memory a representation of a system of two or more 
related variables (e.g., the event involving Carol and her muddy shoes). Children possess the 
ability to represent entities that are absent late in their first year of life (Harris, 1973) and can 
retrieve event representations around 16 months (Bauer & Mandler, 1989), although early on 
these representations are mostly script-based (Hudson, 1990). Second, the child manipulates a 
feature of the representation by positing a false premise (e.g., imagining that Carol had removed 
her shoes). By age 2, children can manipulate existing representations based on new verbal 
information (e.g., represent a previously dry teddy bear as wet; Ganea & Saylor, 2013) and in 
 
  
their third year, they can also do so with representations of past events by combining events from 
episodic memory with present information (Király, Oláh, Csibra, & Kovács, 2018). Finally, the 
child infers causal implications of the false premise (e.g., the floor would be clean), while 
keeping everything else in the representation of the event unchanged. Making causal inferences 
on the basis of a false or negative premise first appears in the context of pretend play around the 
age of 2 (Kavanaugh & Harris, 1994) and children can reason deductively about false premises 
(e.g., all sheep are purple) around the age of 3 (Dias & Harris, 1988). Nevertheless, the ability to 
consider multiple alternatives based on negative premises is cognitively demanding and develops 
over the preschool years (Grigoroglou, Chan, & Ganea 2019; Mody & Carey, 2016). 
In some instances, these processes may be shared with other abilities to consider 
alternatives to reality, but we argue that they are not essential for these other abilities. Consider 
pretend play, an ability some researchers have argued relies on the same cognitive processes as 
counterfactual reasoning (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013). For 
instance, Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) argue that both abilities involve disengaging from reality 
to entertain a premise that counters fact, making causal inferences about this premise while 
keeping the alternative and real worlds separate. While we agree with Weisberg and Gopnik that 
specifying the process underlying counterfactual reasoning is necessary, we disagree with 
aspects of their characterization of this process. Whereas counterfactual reasoning necessarily 
involves retrieving and manipulating a mental representation of reality, pretend play does not. 
Moreover, counterfactual premises conflict with reality, but this need not be the case in pretense. 
According to Harris (2000): 
 
  
In the case of pretend play, children do not set up a contrast between an imaginary event 
and an actual event. They simply invent, watch, or describe an imaginary event; the 
imaginary event has no close cousin in reality with which it contrasts. (p. 124) 
Counterfactual reasoning is based off and constrained by reality. Like counterfactual reasoning, 
pretend play typically involves making causal inferences based on false premises (Weisberg & 
Gopnik, 2013). In this sense, both are informed by causal knowledge of the real world, but only 
counterfactual reasoning involves a comparison to a specific representation of reality. Moreover, 
the counterfactual representation and the initial representation are mutually exclusive in the sense 
that they cannot both be true. 
As we have reviewed, children possess fundamentals of counterfactual reasoning from a 
young age. Yet research indicates that they do not reason counterfactually in many instances 
through middle childhood. Why might this be? We propose that once the general ability to 
reason counterfactually is in place, children’s ability to entertain a counterfactual alternative in a 
given situation depends both on the particular features of their representation of reality and the 
development of a suite of cognitive abilities. 
 
Models of Reality 
To understand children’s counterfactual thinking, we argue that it is essential to 
characterize their model of reality since this is the input from which counterfactual inferences are 
drawn. This may be a representation of an event from episodic memory (e.g., two people walked 
into the kitchen with muddy shoes) or a causal system from semantic memory (e.g., an 
ecosystem). The extent to which the representation in question is an accurate depiction of reality 
depends in part on the ease and accuracy with which children store and retrieve such 
 
  
representations from memory. Developmentally, we expect children’s ability to encode and 
retrieve memory representations to constrain their counterfactual reasoning. We also expect 
children’s counterfactual reasoning to be scaffolded when their memory is supported (through 
repeated exposure to the same events or use of visual cues). 
Beyond ease and accuracy of memory, how a child has interpreted an event or system 
determines the parameters of his or her model, in terms of the number of and presence or absence 
of causal relations between events or entities, and the probabilistic nature of these relations. 
These features influence the causal inferences the child draws. This means that children’s 
counterfactual inferences should vary according to the model of reality they represent. Consider 
a case in which children are asked to reason about a scenario with two individuals who walked 
on a floor with muddy shoes. A child who represents the two antecedent events as independent 
(e.g., the two went into the kitchen separately) will generate different counterfactual inferences 
than one who represents them as connected (e.g., one character imitated the other). Evidence 
from a recent study supports this prediction: When presented with narratives in which antecedent 
events were disconnected as in a common effect model (events A and B both independently 
cause C) versus connected as in a causal chain model (event A causes event B, both cause C), 8-
year-olds made counterfactual inferences that were consistent with these models (Nyhout, 
Henke, & Ganea, 2019). Six-year-olds could reason more successfully about scenarios in which 
antecedent events were causally connected to one another than when they were disconnected. 
When causal relations between events were ambiguous, the performance of both younger and 
older children was chance-like. 
The complexity of the causal model, in terms of the number of intervening events, can 
influence counterfactual reasoning. For instance, children find it easier to reason about direct 
 
  
rather than indirect effects of counterfactual changes, both in short narratives involving agents 
(German & Nichols, 2003; but see Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2010) and in biological systems 
(e.g., food chains; Nyhout, Sweatman, & Ganea, 2019). Children also appear to reason earlier 
about simple events with a single cause than events in which two or more events lead to the same 
outcome (overdetermined events). For instance, 4-year-olds who heard a single-cause story in 
which a character made a floor dirty with her muddy shoes inferred that the floor would be clean 
if she had removed her shoes (Harris et al., 1996; Rafetseder et al., 2013). However, in 
overdetermined cases, when a second cause of an outcome was present (e.g., another character 
with muddy shoes) and children were asked to consider that one of the characters had removed 
his or her shoes, children as old as 6 (Nyhout, Henke, et al., 2019) or even 13 (Rafetseder et al., 
2013) answered incorrectly that the floor would be clean, disregarding the second cause of the 
outcome. Based on these findings, Rafetseder and colleagues (2010, 2013, 2014) have argued 
that young children who correctly answer in the single-cause cases rely on a simpler form of 
reasoning, basic conditional reasoning, in which children use general causal knowledge to arrive 
at a correct answer. 
However, evidence suggests that children can reason counterfactually about 
overdetermined physical events—compared to events involving human agents in narratives—by 
the age of 4 (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019a) or 6 years (McCormack, Ho, Gribben, O’Connor, & 
Hoerl, 2018). For example, preschoolers in one study were familiarized with a box that lit up 
when certain types of blocks were placed on it (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019a). On overdetermined 
trials, when two causal blocks were placed on the box, 4- and 5-year-olds reasoned correctly that 
the lights would still be on if one of the two blocks had not been placed on the box. When the 
stimuli were removed and children had to access and manipulate a mental representation of the 
 
  
event (Study 2), they still reasoned successfully about the overdetermined counterfactual 
alternative. 
In addition to the pattern of causal relations children represent (e.g., causal chain versus 
common effect) and the complexity of the causal model (e.g., single cause versus 
overdetermined), we also expect that the probabilistic nature of the causal relations within the 
model will influence counterfactual inferences. Whether children represent a causal relation as 
deterministic (i.e., A and B always co-occur) or probabilistic (i.e., A and B sometimes co-occur) 
could lead to different counterfactual inferences. Consider a button that always turns on a light 
versus one that sometimes turns on a light (perhaps because its battery is low). If one observes an 
event in which the light is off and a character stumbles in the dark, and is asked “if she had 
pressed the button, would the light have come on?” one is likely to have more certainty in the 
deterministic (always) versus the probabilistic (sometimes) case. Research with adults indicates 
that their counterfactual inferences diverge depending on whether a causal relation is 
deterministic or probabilistic (Rips & Edwards, 2013). In summary, the exact causal relations the 
child represents and the reliability of those relations—shaped by their domain-specific causal 
knowledge—influence their counterfactual inferences. 
 A related factor that is likely to influence children’s counterfactual inferences is their 
domain-specific causal knowledge (Sobel, 2011). Children’s domain knowledge influences both 
how they represent causal relations in their model of reality and the causal inferences they draw 
based on counterfactual premises. Presumably, the more an individual knows about a domain, 
the more accurate his or her inferences about changes to real events. Individuals may also 
perceive events in some domains as more deterministic than others. For instance, adults judge 
physical events as more deterministic than psychological ones (Strickland, Silver, & Keil, 2017). 
 
  
Comparing across studies, the findings suggest that children are more successful at reasoning 
counterfactually about physical systems (McCormack et al., 2018; Nyhout & Ganea, 2019a) than 
about structurally similar problems involving human agents (Nyhout, Henke, et al., 2019; 
Rafetseder et al., 2013) and biological causal systems (Nyhout, Sweatman, et al., 2019). This 
could be because children perceive physical events as more deterministic. However, one study 
that compared children’s counterfactual inferences about physical and emotional causal events 
did not find the predicted differences (Beck et al., 2010). Researchers need to compare children’s 
counterfactual reasoning across different domains, controlling tightly for other potential factors, 




Given the requirements to maintain, manipulate, and compare representations during 
counterfactual reasoning, executive functions (inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, and 
working memory) are implicated (Beck & Riggs, 2014). In studies, individual differences in 
inhibitory control (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009), cognitive flexibility (Guajardo, McNally, & 
Wright, 2016), and working memory (Guajardo, Parker, & Turley-Ames, 2009) correlated with 
children’s counterfactual reasoning, though findings have been mixed (e.g., Beck et al., 2009). 
Although executive function is related to counterfactual reasoning, researchers should investigate 
whether it is a matter of competence or performance. In other words, is it necessary for 
counterfactual reasoning or does it merely constrain it in contexts where demands are high (e.g., 





 Children’s verbal IQ—which is a proxy for general intelligence—predicts their 
counterfactual reasoning (Beck et al., 2009). Here, we focus on a more specific linguistic feature 
of counterfactuals: their grammatical complexity. In many languages, and in most studies, 
counterfactuals are often framed in the past subjunctive (e.g., “If I had taken my shoes off…”). 
Children may not show earlier evidence of counterfactual reasoning because they have not yet 
mastered this linguistic form (Kuczaj & Daly, 1979). Given that many of the core processes of 
counterfactual reasoning are in place early in development, we predict that children should have 
earlier access to counterfactuals that are expressed in less complex linguistic constructions. 
Children express hypothetical alternatives using simpler language (e.g., almost) before they have 
a command of the past subjunctive (Harris, 1997, Study 2). Developing versions of tasks that 
place fewer verbal demands on children may allow them to demonstrate success at an earlier age. 
In specifying the role that language plays in the development of counterfactual thinking, studies 
should also consider groups whose linguistic input is limited (e.g., deaf children of hearing 
parents) or nonhuman primates. 
 
New Directions: Counterfactuals in Learning 
Most developmental research has asked when children can reason counterfactually. Some 
work has focused on potential qualitative differences in the processes involved in hypothetical 
thinking across development (e.g., Rafetseder et al., 2010). A critical next step is for researchers 
to move beyond the question of when (developmentally) to when (contextually) children reason 
counterfactually, what they reason about, and how it may support learning. In this section, we 
 
  
highlight emerging research on counterfactual reasoning in light of its purported functions for 
decision-making and learning. 
Much research with adults has examined the functional utility of counterfactuals, 
suggesting that the availability of counterfactual alternatives affects people’s causal judgments 
(e.g., Mandel, 2003; Wells & Gavanski, 1989) and their future behavior (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 
2008). Counterfactual thinking may play a similar role in middle childhood. In one study, 6- and 
7-year-olds who experienced regret—a counterfactual emotion—on a delay-of-gratification task 
were more likely to delay gratification on a subsequent task than children who did not experience 
regret (McCormack, O’Connor, Cherry, Beck, & Feeney, 2019). Claims about the adaptive 
nature of counterfactual thinking rest on evidence for their spontaneous use in everyday contexts. 
Little research has investigated whether children engage in counterfactual reasoning 
spontaneously (Kuczaj & Daly, 1979; Guajardo et al., 2016). Given that some studies suggest 
that children are competent at counterfactual reasoning between the ages of 4 and 6, researchers 
need to investigate the spontaneous occurrence of counterfactuals in more naturalistic contexts. 
In addition to influencing behavior, does counterfactual reasoning influence learning? 
New developmental work is examining the relevance of counterfactual reasoning to science 
learning and scientific reasoning. Thinking counterfactually may influence both the output and 
the process of scientific reasoning. Given that counterfactuals are imagined interventions, we 
may predict that counterfactuals support learning about causal systems that are subject to these 
interventions. Both counterfactual and scientific reasoning involve setting forth a premise and 
reasoning about its outcomes, and typically involve isolating a single possible cause and holding 
all else constant (e.g., Gopnik & Walker, 2013; Mackie, 1974; Rafetseder & Perner, 2014). 
Given the structural similarity between counterfactuals and physical experiments, one may also 
 
  
expect engaging in counterfactual reasoning to provide a mental blueprint for a physical 
experiment. Recent results support both claims. In one study, 7- and 8-year-olds who were 
prompted to think counterfactually about the location of the Earth (i.e., whether it was closer to 
or farther from the sun) had a deeper understanding of the complex concept of planetary 
habitability than children prompted to think factually about different planets (e.g., Venus and 
Neptune; Nyhout & Ganea, 2019b). In another study, 7- to 10-year-olds who were prompted to 
think counterfactually performed more optimally in designing a controlled test of a hypothesis 
than children given control prompts (Nyhout, Iannuzziello, Walker, & Ganea, 2019). 
Researchers need to compare the abilities to reason counterfactually, causally, and scientifically 
because this work has relevance for both theoretical debates and science education. This work 
suggests an exciting possibility: Engaging in counterfactual worlds may help children learn about 
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